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ABSTRACT
This Article deals with the controversy surrounding the teaching of evolutionary theory in 
American public schools, with a specific focus on disclaimers read by teachers before they teach 
evolution. With the rise of religious fundamentalism and the correspondent change in the 
American socio-legal climate, questions of religion and interpretation of the Religion Clauses of 
the U.S. Constitution have become increasingly pertinent. In particular, the precise relationship 
between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses is of special importance with religious 
groups now more vocal in their articulation of their free exercise rights.  
The current form of disclaimer either mentions specific religious theories about origins as 
alternatives to evolution, or denigrates evolutionary theory in more indirect ways.  Because such 
disclaimers are clearly antithetical to the neutrality concerns of the Establishment Clause, they 
have been held unconstitutional by all courts to date, including the December 2005 Kitzmiller
case in Dover, Pennsylvania.  However, this Article suggests that striking down the disclaimers 
without providing alternative responses to the legitimate free exercise concerns involved may 
violate the Free Exercise Clause. As a way of negotiating free exercise and establishment 
concerns, this Article proposes a generalized disclaimer: one that does not single out 
evolutionary theory for special treatment, but rather addresses scientific inquiry as a whole. 
Generalized disclaimers neither discriminate among religion, or between religion and non-
religion, or between scientific theories.  This Article will then go on to discuss whether such 
generalized disclaimers can ever be constitutional, despite their origins in the evolution 
controversy.  That is, are they poisoned by their roots, or can they be purged of this poison if 
they become sufficiently neutral in form? This Article will conclude that the formally neutral 
generalized disclaimers should be upheld on constitutional grounds.
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3INTRODUCTION
The battle between creationism and evolution in American public schools has long 
captivated the American public. Ever since the evolution controversy in the Scopes Trial of 
1927,1 a few states have struggled to come up with a resolution as state school boards deal with 
numerous proposals on ways to eliminate or counter the teaching of evolution. These proposals 
have included such diverse measures as: (1) making creationism the sole basis of the curriculum; 
(2) giving “equal time” to creationism and evolution; (3) offering intelligent design theory as an 
alternative to evolution;2 and (4) reading or printing disclaimers along with materials on 
evolution.3  This last measure is among the latest in the long history of the teaching of 
evolutionary theory in public schools. Evolution disclaimers are either read out loud before the 
teacher commences the lesson on evolutionary theory, or are printed on stickers that are pasted 
inside biology textbooks. Regardless of form, the substance of the enacted disclaimers is the 
same—disclaimers note weaknesses in evolutionary theory4 and in some cases mention 
alternative theories of creation. Although the Fifth Circuit has struck down on establishment 
grounds a disclaimer mentioning only the Biblical version of creation as an alternative to the 
evolutionary theory of origins, no court has ever held that facially neutral disclaimers (i.e., 
disclaimers that have no reference to any religious theory) are problematic on the basis of the 
1
 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
2 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., No. 04cv2688, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 33647 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
3 See Judith A. Villarreal, God and Darwin in the Classroom: The Creation/Evolution Controversy, 64 CHI. KENT.
L. REV. 335, 345 (1988). 
4 See F. Arthur Jones, A Creative Solution?: Assessing the Constitutionality of a New Creation/Evolution 
Disclaimer, 49 LOY. L. REV. 519, 532 (2003) (describing the Alabama evolution disclaimer, which discusses the 
factual weaknesses of evolutionary theory).
4Establishment Clause.5  This Article will discuss whether such facially neutral disclaimers, 
despite their origins in the evolution controversy, can ever be constitutionally permissible.
The analytical starting point is acknowledging that establishment analysis is tempered by 
the free exercise concerns implicated in any given case. This Article will examine the 
jurisprudence and demonstrate how the Court defines the prongs of the various establishment 
tests differently according to the type of free exercise issues presented.  As a way of organizing 
the complexity of this approach, this Article proposes dividing cases into categories, with each 
category including cases that have similar facts and present similar sorts of free exercise-
establishment concerns. (This organizational method will be referred to as the “categorical 
approach.”)
This Article explores the unique free exercise-establishment issues involved in the issue 
of disclaimers on evolution teaching by proposing a generalized disclaimer: one that does not 
single out evolutionary theory for special treatment, but rather addresses scientific inquiry as a 
whole. Generalized disclaimers neither discriminate among religion, or between religion and 
non-religion, or between scientific theories. Their non-discriminatory content is in conformity 
with the requirements of the Establishment Clause, and their purpose is to respond to the 
legitimate free exercise concerns of those parents opposed to the teaching of evolution.  This 
Article suggests that generalized disclaimers be classified in the same category as other 
government measures that arise from a constitutionally problematic history, but have been 
subsequently modified from their previously unconstitutional forms. This Article will then go on 
to define this category, which it will refer to as the “untainted fruits of the poisonous tree” 
5 See Winston R. Kitchingham, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: The Fifth Circuit Leaves William 
Jennings Bryan on an Establishment Clause Cross, 75 TUL. L. REV. 533, 546 (2000) (because courts have not 
addressed “the broader question of evolution disclaimers ... it is unclear exactly what elements would comprise an 
acceptable disclaimer”). In this Article, the phrase will be used to refer to an approach that deals with government 
measures rooted in a history of establishment violations.
5(hereafter “untainted fruits”).6  This Article will propose that the constitutional determination 
within this category is whether the modified version is in fact an “untainted fruit” rather than an 
inadequately modified (that is, “tainted”) fruit of the poisonous tree.
Part I evaluates proposed and enacted evolution disclaimers and the cases in which those 
disclaimers have been challenged. Part II provides an overview of the various establishment tests 
and their role in a relatively confused jurisprudence. Part III evaluates the constitutionality of 
currently enacted disclaimers. Part IV discusses the free exercise-establishment tension 
implicated in the case of disclaimers on evolution teaching. Part IV first proposes the generalized 
disclaimer as a solution to this tension. This Part then goes on to use this hypothetical 
generalized disclaimer to explore the contours of the jurisprudential analysis of “untainted 
fruits.” 
I. EVOLUTION DISCLAIMERS
A. Proposed and Enacted Disclaimers
Currently, Alabama and Georgia are the only states whose school boards have instituted 
evolution disclaimers in their public schools. In 1996 when Alabama first began inserting 
evolution disclaimers in students’ biology textbooks,7 the state’s decision stirred much debate.8
However, in November 2001 the Alabama Board of Education enacted a new disclaimer which 
6 The term is taken from the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in criminal procedure. This doctrine serves as an 
exclusionary rule, excluding from trial all evidence that derives from a violation of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights. Mark S. Bransdorfer, Note, Miranda Right-to-Counsel Violations and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
Doctrine, 62 IND. L.J. 1061 (1987).
7 CNN.com Education, Alabama Keeps Evolution Warning on Books (visited Oct. 15, 2004) <http://archives.
cnn.com/2001/fyi/teachers.ednews/11/09/evolution.ap/> (The “sticker contained questions students should ask about 
evolution, such as: ‘Why do major groups of plants and animals have no transitional forms in the fossil record?’”).
8 Id.
6faced no dissent9 and was strongly supported by the Christian Coalition and the Eagle Forum.10
It reads in part:
A MESSAGE FROM THE ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION [to be 
pasted in all biology textbooks]: This textbook discusses evolution, a controversial theory 
some scientists present as a scientific explanation for the origin of living things, such as 
plants, animals and humans. No one was present when life first appeared on earth. 
Therefore, any statement about life's origins should be considered as theory, not fact. The 
word "evolution" may refer to many types of change. Evolution describes changes that 
occur within a species. (White moths, for example, may "evolve" into gray moths.) This 
process is microevolution, which can be observed and described as fact. Evolution may 
also refer to the change of one living thing to another, such as reptiles into birds. This 
process, called macroevolution, has never been observed and should be considered a 
theory. Evolution also refers to the unproven belief that random, undirected forces 
produced a world of living things.11
It is important to note that this disclaimer, like many others, describes evolution as a 
theory about the “origin of living things.” To describe it as such reflects a fundamental scientific 
misunderstanding built into the disclaimer specifically and the evolution/creationism battle 
generally, because evolutionary theory is neither a theory of creation nor a theory about the 
origins of life. There are in fact two areas of science that are at odds with creationism: 
cosmology, which for example describes how there came to be certain molecules and not others, 
and evolution, a theory about life on earth. Specifically, evolution addresses how the 
differentiations of kinds of things from algae to people arose. In between cosmology and 
evolution, there is much speculation about the origins of life, although there is no real scientific 
9 Id.
10 Id. (“The decision was actively supported by the Christian Coalition and the Eagle Forum, groups that seek more 
religious activity in public schools.”). The Eagle Forum’s mission statement:
We support the Declaration of Independence and its fundamental doctrine that we owe our existence to the 
Creator who has endowed each of us with inalienable rights. We support the U.S. Constitution as the 
instrument of securing those God-given rights. We acknowledge the Holy Scriptures as the source of the 
best code of moral conduct.
Alabama Eagle Forum, Our Mission (visited Oct. 11, 2004) <http://www.alabamaeagle.org/>. 
11Alabama State Bd. of Educ., A Message from the Alabama State Board of Education (visited Sept. 19, 2004)
<http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/1995/dec95/textbook.html>. 
7theory.12  However, because evolution is referred to as a theory of origins in both evolution 
disclaimers and the larger surrounding debate, it will be referred to as such in this paper.
Aside from its scientific problems, this disclaimer which is also included in course 
guidelines for science teachers13 has also not yet been challenged on establishment grounds.14
Considering that Alabama is predominantly Christian,15 the disclaimer’s language is relatively 
weak, and the residents may be weary of controversy, it is likely this new disclaimer will remain 
unchallenged.16
However, while the current Alabama disclaimer seems relatively safe from challenge, an 
evolution disclaimer proposed in Oklahoma led to legal disputes.17 As the Oklahoma State 
Textbook Committee wanted “textbook publishers to stop presenting evolution as fact and 
present other options such as creationism—the theory that God or another higher power created 
the universe,”18 it proposed adopting a disclaimer identical to the Alabama disclaimer; however,
the Oklahoma Attorney General rejected the enactment of the disclaimer as beyond the board’s 
legitimate powers.19
A proposed disclaimer in Louisiana did not fare much better than the one in Oklahoma 
although as with Oklahoma’s version, the Louisiana disclaimer was virtually identical to the 
Alabama disclaimer.20  The disclaimer was adopted by Louisiana's Board of Elementary and 
12 Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe, Big Bang Cosmology (visited Nov. 1, 2005) <http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/
m_uni/ uni_101bb1.html>.
13 See supra note 7. 
14
 Jones, supra note 4, at 532.
15
 In 1990, 93.30% of Alabama residents were Christian. Adherents.com—Religion by Location, Alabama (visited 
Oct. 11, 2004) <http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh_6.html>. 
16 See supra note 4, at 533.
17 Id.
18
 Diane Plumberg, Disclaimer Sends Message to Publishers, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN 12A (Nov. 11, 1999) 
(“A sticker in next year's science textbooks, warning students about evolution, is meant as a message to publishers
that at least a few educators in Oklahoma would like to teach something else.”).
19
 Barbara Hoberock and Scott Cooper, Vote To Disclaim Negated: State's AG Says Book Committee Lacks 
Authority, TULSA WORLD (Oklahoma) 1 (Feb. 3, 2000).  
20 Id.
8Secondary Education, but this same school board rejected it in 2002.21 Along with recognizing 
Alabama was the only other state that had adopted such a disclaimer, Louisiana’s decision was 
based on its reluctance to fight a battle “it has entered so many times before and lost.”22
Because the Oklahoma and Louisiana disclaimers failed on political grounds, their failure 
says little about whether or not they are constitutionally valid.23 However, the constitutionality of 
evolution disclaimers remains a relevant issue as is demonstrated by past and current legal 
challenges. 
B. Case Law
1. Freiler, Selman, and Kitzmiller.
Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education24 is the case that brought the issue of 
evolution disclaimers to the forefront. The Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education in Louisiana 
sought to disclaim any endorsement of evolution via the following notice: 
It is hereby recognized by the . . . Board of Education, that the lesson to be presented, 
regarding the origin of life and matter, is known as the Scientific Theory of Evolution and 
should be presented to inform students of the scientific concept and not intended to 
influence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation or any other concept.  It is further 
recognized . . . that it is the basic right and privilege of each student to form his/her own 
opinion and maintain beliefs taught by parents on this very important matter of the origin 
of life and matter. Students are urged to exercise critical thinking and gather all 
information possible and closely examine each alternative toward forming an opinion.25
21
 Laura Maggi, Evolution Disclaimer is Struck Down; BESE Refuses to Attach Message to Science Books, TIMES-
PICAYUNE 4 (Dec. 13, 2002).
22 Id.
23
 Jones, supra note 4, at 535.
24 Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).  
25 Id. at 341.
9This disclaimer, which teachers were required to read immediately before teaching evolution, 
was the School Board’s response to parental concerns26 that lessons on evolution were troubling 
for their children as evolutionary theory contradicted what the children had learned at home and 
in church about the origins of life and matter.27 The disclaimer was intended as a non-intrusive 
measure to address the needs of a pluralistic student body and protect the rights of children and 
parents without altering the school curriculum.28
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down this 
disclaimer as unconstitutional.29 According to the court, not only did the disclaimer’s reference 
to the Biblical theory of creation specifically and to the exclusion of any other specific theory of 
origins protect and maintain Biblical beliefs about creation, but other aspects of the disclaimer 
were also problematic, not because they protected specific religious content but rather because 
they protected a religious viewpoint over a non-religious one. 30
Freiler illustrates the current context of the evolution controversy. School boards 
interested in countering the effects of evolution teaching in public schools must adjust their 
“strategy of including religious viewpoints in public education by exploring the untested 
contours” of previous decisions.31 Any measure that the courts have not yet struck down is still 
available as a possible means of countering the teaching of evolution. Freiler suggests one way in 
which the Supreme Court might respond to the constitutional question.
26 See M. Drew DeMott, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Board of Education: Disclaiming “The Gospel of Modern Science”, 
12 REGENT U. L. REV. 597, 600 (2001).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 185 F.3d at 349.
30 Id. at 346.
31
 Jones, supra note 4, at 531.
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One of the more recent cases to consider the constitutionality of an evolution disclaimer 
is Selman v. Cobb County School District.32 In Selman, the Georgia school board required that 
all new science textbooks bear a sticker reading: “This textbook contains material on evolution. 
Evolution is a theory, not a fact, regarding the origin of living thing. This material should be 
approached with an open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered.”33 The plaintiffs, 
parents of students, argued this disclaimer violated the Establishment Clause by restricting the 
teaching of evolution while promoting the teaching of creationism.34 In evaluating the 
constitutionality of the sticker, a federal district court held it had the effect of endorsing a 
religious viewpoint.35
The most recent case on the constitutionality of evolution disclaimers is Kitzmiller v. 
Dover Area School District.36 Although focusing largely on the constitutionality of teaching 
intelligent design theory in public schools, the dispute over this theory centered on the disclaimer 
teachers were required to read to biology students:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin's Theory 
of Evolution … Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new 
evidence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there 
is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range 
of observations. Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs 
from Darwin's view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students 
who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent Design actually 
involves. With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind. The 
school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual students and their 
families.37
As with the disclaimers in Freiler and Selman, the Kitzmiller disclaimer noted the 
weaknesses of evolution and denigrated its credibility by playing on lay notions of “theory.”  
32 Selman v. Cobb County School Dist., No. 102-CV-2325-CC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 432 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
33 Id. at *13.
34 Id. at *70. 
35 Id. at *59.
36 No. 04cv2688, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 33647 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
37 Id. at *2.
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Despite the explanation of “theory” as being “a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range 
of observations,”38 the use of the term “gaps” emphasized lack of credibility with respect to 
evolutionary theory, though no such connotation is attached to the intelligent design theory 
subsequently mentioned. Further, the juxtaposition of evolution, information about its potential 
gaps, and the mention of intelligent design theory suggested that intelligent design and evolution 
were of equal scientific value, with intelligent design perhaps even being more credible as no 
“gaps” were mentioned in relation to it.39
Moreover, the description of intelligent design as an “explanation of the origins of life” 
and Of Pandas and People as a “reference book” implicitly emphasized the alleged scientific 
validity of intelligent design.40  However, the court noted that even a cursory examination of Of 
Pandas and People revealed the religious rather than scientific nature of intelligent design 
theory.41  Although it did not make an overtly religious reference as did the Freiler disclaimer, 
the Kitzmiller disclaimer did make an indirect reference to religion. As such, the court struck 
down the disclaimer as favoring religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.42
As in Selman, Kitzmiller deals with evolution disclaimers that are not facially biased 
toward religion. The disclaimers at issue in these cases, especially the one in Selman, are 
comparable to several other evolution disclaimers, including the one currently used in Alabama 
and those that came close to being adopted in Louisiana and Oklahoma. Thus the Selman and 
Kitzmiller holdings regarding the unconstitutionality of disclaimers on evolution teaching will 
provide guidance for future plaintiffs who want to challenge similar disclaimers in other states.  
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at *29 (“The description of the designer in Of Pandas and People…is a ‘master intellect,’ strongly suggesting a 
supernatural deity as opposed to any intelligent actor known to exist in the natural world.”).
42 Id. at *174.
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2. Daniel and Mozert.
In addition to Freiler and Selman which dealt directly with evolution disclaimers, several 
cases have done so indirectly as part of their constitutional analyses of other state-sponsored 
religious measures. The first of these, Daniel v. Waters,43 involved a Tennessee statute that 
required textbooks dealing with the question of origins to carry disclaimers stating that evolution 
(or any other non-Biblical account of creation) was theory, not fact.44  The statute also required 
such textbooks to give equal treatment to Biblical and scientific theories of creation.45 The Sixth 
Circuit struck down the statute as facially unconstitutional,46 with the court focusing on the 
preferential treatment given to “the Biblical version of creation as opposed to any account of the 
development of man based on scientific research and reasoning”47 and holding that the statute 
impermissibly required teaching to be tailored to religious dogma.  
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education48 made a subtle but important point about 
problematic elements of evolution disclaimers. The case dealt with reading textbooks on various 
subjects rather than specifically with biology texts.49 The parents of some of the school’s 
students discovered a number of stories in the texts that they considered contradictory to their 
family’s religious beliefs.50 Interestingly, the texts carried an evolution disclaimer stating 
43
 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 487.  The statute reads: 
Any [biology] textbook . . . used in the public education system which expresses an opinion or relates to a 
theory or theories shall give in the same textbook and under the same subject commensurate attention to, 
and an equal amount of emphasis on, the origins and creation of man and his world as the same is recorded 
in other theories, including, but not limited to, the Genesis account in the Bible.
Id.
46 Id. at 490.  The Court noted the “First Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning 
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.” Id.
47 Id.
48
 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
49 Id. at 1060.
50 Id. at 1061.
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“evolution is a theory, not a proven scientific fact.”51 The court stated the plaintiffs gave 
inadequate attention to the effect of this disclaimer,52 thereby seemingly suggesting that because 
the disclaimer responded to the concerns of religious groups, its inclusion in the texts 
undermined the plaintiffs’ argument that the texts were hostile to religious beliefs.53
II. ESTABLISHMENT VERSUS FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has used various tests to determine whether a government action 
violates the Establishment Clause, incoluding: the Lemon test,54 the endorsement test,55 the 
coercion test,56 and the neutrality test.57 If the government measure does not meet the particular 
test used by the court in any given case, it violates the Establishment Clause.58
51 Id. at 1062.
52 Id. In describing the testimony of one of the parent-plaintiffs, the opinion states: 
Describing evolution as a teaching that there is no God, she identified 24 passages that she considered to 
have evolution as a theme.  She admitted that the textbooks contained a disclaimer that evolution is a 
theory, not a proven scientific fact.  Nevertheless, she felt that references to evolution were so pervasive 
and presented in such a factual manner as to render the disclaimer meaningless. 
(emphasis added).  
53 Id.
54 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating there are three tests that can be gleaned from Supreme 
Court establishment jurisprudence: “[F]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.”).  
55 County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (defining “endorsement” as 
closely linked to promotion and stating that the endorsement test examines whether the government is promoting 
one religion or religious theory over: (1) another religion or religious theory; or (2) irreligion).
56 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (the coercion test holds that "at a minimum . . . government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] 
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so’”).
57 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (“If the religious, irreligious, and a religious are all alike eligible for 
governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been 
done at the behest of the government.”).
58 See Elizabeth A. Harvey, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: Squeeze the Lemon Test out of 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 305 (2001) (listing the various establishment 
tests and the elements of each).
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The existence of numerous tests has created much confusion in establishment 
jurisprudence. Courts do not analyze each case under all establishment tests; rather, the common 
practice is to choose the test on the basis of the specific factual scenario of each case.59 Such 
case-by- case determination of which test to use is perhaps inevitable considering the lack of 
guidance by the Supreme Court on how to conduct the analysis.  In recent cases, the Supreme 
Court has used the Lemon test alone, “used a modified Lemon test, used Lemon in combination 
with another test, and even declined to mention Lemon in its opinion.”60
When additional tests such as the endorsement, coercion, and neutrality tests are added to 
the mix, establishment jurisprudence becomes almost impossible to navigate.61 Moreover, 
acknowledging the “hopeless disarray”62 of establishment law requires an understanding that 
what is usually determinative in the legal analysis is not the greater purpose of the Establishment 
Clause63 or the ways in which the various tests reflect its principles; rather, what matters is how 
the tests are applied, with one or more tests preferred over others on the facts of a specific case.64
1. The Establishment Tests
59
 Andrea A. Mittlieder, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: Ignoring the Flaws in the Establishment 
Clause, 46 LOY. L. REV 467, 481 (2000).
60 Id.
61 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 370 (“Because the [Supreme] Court has applied a variety of tests (in various combinations) in 
school prayer cases, federal appellate courts have also followed an inconsistent approach.”).
62 Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas concurring) (“[O]ur Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray.”).
63 See Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L.
REV.  551, 582 (1998) (the Establishment Clause is a “co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious 
liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone.”).  The Establishment 
Clause was enacted as the necessary complement of the Free Exercise Clause, with the latter giving citizens 
religious freedom and the former restricting state involvement in the propagation of one religion over another, or 
religion over irreligion. 
64 See Jeffrey Wahl, Comment, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: A Missed Opportunity, 28 OHIO 
N.U.L. REV. 433, 440-59 (2002) (distinguishing between what the Court should decide and what it most likely will
decide—a distinction that admittedly exists in legal analyses of all subjects but is especially important in the 
establishment context). Although the Establishment Clause was not intended to invoke or permit hostility toward 
religion, its application according to one or more of the tests may lead to hostility toward religion. Id. at 433.  
15
(i) The Lemon Test (1971). The Lemon test has three prongs: (1) “secular legislative 
purpose”; (2) “primary effect”; and (3) “excessive entanglement.”65 The “secular legislative 
purpose” prong of the Lemon test requires the Court look into the “rationale behind the adoption 
of the challenged statute.”66 If the actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion, the 
statute is unconstitutional.67 However, this prong is violated only if the state-sponsored practice 
or statute is wholly motivated by an intent68 to advance religion.69
The “primary effect” prong asks whether regardless of legislative intent, the statute or 
state-sponsored action “conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval” of religion.70 For 
example, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,71 the Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts zoning 
statute that allowed a church to veto the issuance of a liquor license to any establishment located 
within a 500-foot radius of the church violated the Establishment Clause.72 According to the 
Court, the law had the primary effect of advancing religion because "the churches' power under 
the statute [was] standardless” and the “mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative 
authority by Church and State provides significant benefit to religion in the minds of some by 
reason of the power conferred."73
The third prong of the Lemon test, “excessive entanglement”, asks whether the adoption 
of the statute in question would lead to excessive government involvement in monitoring the 
65 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
66 Id.
67 Id.
68
 Throughout this essay, “intent” and “purpose” will be used interchangeably.
69 See Mittlieder, supra note 59, at 472-73 (“[w]hile the state may present an infinite array of avowed purposes, the 
challenged action will survive this test provided that at least one purported purpose” furthers a permissible state 
objective).
70
 Harvey, supra note 58, at 305.
71
 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 125-26.  
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activity for possible breaches of constitutional limits.74 For example, in Aguilar v. Felton,75 the 
statute at issue provided financial assistance to programs that served the needs of educationally 
deprived children from low-income families.76 As part of its plan, the statute used federal funds 
to pay the salaries of public employees in parochial schools.77 Thus to make sure that federal 
funds were not being used to promote religious beliefs, the government would have actively to 
monitor the schools’ curricula and the teachers’ actions. The Supreme Court held that such 
constant monitoring would require excessive entanglement of the government with the religious 
body.78
(ii) The Endorsement Test (1984).79  Importantly, this last prong was dropped in the 
subsequent development of a new establishment test: the endorsement test. As it was articulated 
in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,80 the endorsement test is composed 
of the “primary effect” and “secular legislative purpose” prongs of the Lemon test.81 The 
endorsement test precludes the government from conveying or attempting to convey a message 
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. As the test is essentially a 
74 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13
75 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
76 Id. at 404.
77 Id.
78 Id. The Supreme Court has never stated that the Lemon test is binding; in fact, although Lemon has never been 
overruled, in recent times the Court has expressed its disagreement with the test. See Linda P. McKenzie, Note, The 
Pledge of Allegiance: One Nation Under God?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 379, 402 (2004) (stating the Supreme Court is 
divided on the value of the Lemon test); Sherman v. Community Consolidated School Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 
(7th Cir. 1992) (“The Court heard Lee v. Weisman in large part to reconsider Lemon, and Lee concluded without 
renewing Lemon's lease.”).
79
 Theologos Verginis, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board: Is There Salvation for the 
Establishment Clause? "With God All Things Are Possible", 34 AKRON L. REV. 741, 766 n.29 (2001) (“The 
endorsement test originated from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly (465 U.S. 668 
(1984)). Justice O'Connor extrapolated the "purpose and effect" prongs of the Lemon test and redefined them.”).
80
 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
81 Id. at 593-94.
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disjunction of two Lemon prongs, any statute that violates either of those prongs also violates the 
endorsement test.82
(iii) The Coercion Test (1992). Distinct from the Lemon and endorsement tests is the 
coercion test, which was first articulated in Lee v. Weisman83 involving a public school system 
that allowed principals to invite clergy to offer invocations and benediction prayers at graduation 
ceremonies.84 In striking down the practice on establishment grounds, the Supreme Court held 
that including clerical members exerted coercive pressure on those who objected to the inclusion 
of religion in public graduation ceremonies.85
The Court defined “coercion” as “an attempt to employ the machinery of the state to 
enforce a religious orthodoxy.”86 Coercion can be direct or indirect, with the nature of the 
environment in which the government program or action is implemented contributing to the 
coercive impact of the measure.87
(iv) The Neutrality Test (2000). The Supreme Court finally developed one other 
establishment test, the neutrality test. The Court in Mitchell v. Helms88 used the term "neutrality" 
to refer to “generality or evenhandedness of distribution as relevant in judging whether a benefit 
82
 492 U.S. at 306.  
83 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
84 Id. at 585. 
85 Id.
86 Id. at 592.
87
 In Lee, for example, the Court gave special focus to religious measures in public schools and noted “there are 
heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and 
secondary public schools ... [t]he concern is not limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced there.” 
Id. at 594. The special characteristics of a public school setting, where the students are relatively impressionable and 
the schools are in a unique position of authority, add weight to the coercive power of public schools’ religiously 
motivated programs. Id. These special circumstances are the most important factor in the coercion analysis of 
evolution disclaimers.
88 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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scheme so characterized should be seen as aiding a sectarian school's religious mission.”89
Mitchell mentioned three main criteria by which to “evaluate whether government aid has the 
effect of advancing religion: does it result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by 
reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement.”90
2. The Underlying Concern of All Establishment Tests
Although the four tests approach the establishment question from different perspectives, 
the concern motivating each is whether a given government act has the purpose and/or effect of 
favoring or disfavoring religion. Secular legislative purpose and primary effect are two of the 
prongs of the Lemon test and the only prongs of the endorsement test. By their very labels, the 
coercion and neutrality tests reveal a concern about effect (coerciveness) and purpose 
(neutrality). As stated above,91 in Lee, the Court’s definition of “coercion” focused on the 
government’s enforcement of a religious orthodoxy. The concern is that such use of government 
has a coercive effect on those who do not subscribe to the religion in question or to any religion 
at all. With respect to the neutrality test, the Court focuses on the criteria used in deciding who 
receives government aid.92 The criteria must not discriminate between religion and non-religion, 
or among religions, with this requirement thus ensuring government aid will be motivated by a 
neutral purpose.
B. The Free Exercise Clause versus the Establishment Clause
89 Id. at 883.
90 Id. at 808. “Excessive entanglement” in this test is defined the same way as in the Lemon test.
91 See supra Part II.A.1.iii.
92 See supra Part II.A.1.iv.
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The larger establishment context demonstrates that above all, the Court is concerned with 
preventing government measures that are motivated by an improper discriminatory purpose. 
Although framed in terms of “purpose,” the discriminatory rule requires an analysis of effect as 
well. In fact, the consideration of effect is perhaps what distinguishes the establishment analysis 
from the free exercise analysis. 
In the latter, the court looks for a secular legislative purpose in a government action; if 
one is found, the inquiry is satisfied and the measure will be considered constitutional. For 
example, the court in Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith93 held there would be 
no violation of the Free Exercise Clause if a drug rehabilitation organization fired employees 
who ingested peyote for sacramental purposes.94 The state law forbidding use of peyote was 
generally applicable to religious and non-religious individuals alike and was supported by a 
reason unrelated to religious beliefs; thus the lack of discriminatory purpose was sufficient 
grounds for upholding the law.95
In contrast, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,96 the Court 
struck down city ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice, finding the ordinances were motivated 
by animus against the Santeria Church. As such, they were considered “not neutral” nor 
generally applicable and therefore in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.97 The Court did not 
look to the effect of the statutes; all that mattered was their underlying purpose.
The discriminatory purpose rule was first articulated in Everson v. Board of Education of 
Ewing Township,98 in which the Court held that the First Amendment did not prohibit a state 
93
 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
94 Id. at 890.
95 Id.
96 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
97 Id. at 533.
98 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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from using tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils99 as part of a general 
program covering the fares of all local students. The Court stated the “‘establishment of religion’ 
clause of the First Amendment means at least this . . . . Neither [the state nor the federal 
government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another.”100
The rule was again articulated in School District of Abingdon Township, Pennsylvania v. 
Schempp,101 in which the Court explained “to withstand the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion.”102 Also in Epperson v. Arkansas,103 the Court held the government “may not 
be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote 
one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.”104 The 
dual concern of the Establishment Clause with both discriminatory purpose and effect was 
encapsulated in Lemon’s three-prong test, which was intended to capture the cumulative criteria 
developed by the Court in its establishment cases over the course of many years and prevent 
“[t]he three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”105
A comparison of Free Exercise and Establishment cases shows that in establishment 
jurisprudence, if a measure is said to have a neutral purpose, that neutrality must be actualized in 
its effect. In contrast, free exercise jurisprudence places less importance on effect. Smith shows 
that a disparate effect is irrelevant as long as the government measure has a generalized 
99 Id. at 18.
100 Id. at 16.
101 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
102 Id. at 223.
103 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
104 Id. at 104.
105 Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
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purpose.106 Similarly, Lukumi suggested that if a law outlawed animal sacrifice on the basis of 
neutral criteria, it would be upheld regardless of its effect on Santeria religious practice.107
C. Tension between Free Exercise and Establishment Principles
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are meant to work together to ensure 
religion is neither favored nor disfavored; that is, it is not only important that government not 
endorse a particular religious measure, but also that it not be hostile to religion. This concern 
about anti-religious bias has to do with the “inhibition prong” of the Establishment Clause.108
One of the ideas behind the Religion Clauses was that there was a source of “public good” 
outside of—and perhaps higher than—the government or individual.109 The Establishment 
Clause embodies this idea by prohibiting the state from inhibiting religion: 
The inhibition prong acts then as a free exercise component of the Establishment Clause. 
In Justice Brennan's words, the prong prevents the Establishment Clause from being used 
“as a sword to justify repression of religion . . . from any aspect of public life." 
Presumably, then, the same degree of protection that prevents the state from promoting 
religion should apply to prevent it from inhibiting religion, since both are forms of 
religious coercion.110
Despite this free exercise element of the Establishment Clause, in practical application, 
the negotiation between free exercise and establishment principles at times complicates the 
determination of a given government measure’s unconstitutionality. Consider, for example, Elk 
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,111 which dealt with the claim the phrase “under God” 
in the Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional. In this case, Newdow, the father of an 
106
 494 U.S. at 881.
107 508 U.S. at 530.
108
 Winton E. Yerby III, Comment, Toward Religious Neutrality in the Public School Curriculum, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV.  899, 919 (1989).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
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elementary school student, challenged the constitutionality of “under God” by arguing it violated 
the neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause.112 As the amici curiae briefs in favor of 
Newdow pointed out, the phrase can be seen both as discriminating between religion and non-
religion, and among religions. Regarding the former, these briefs contended “[t]o recite the 
Pledge is ‘to declare a belief,’ ... to affirm ‘a belief and an attitude of mind.’”113 Not only this, 
the phrase “under God” also discriminates between monotheistic and polytheist belief systems; 
as one brief pointed out: “The definition of ‘God’ is especially important, particularly in its 
singular, capitalized form, a form that is unique to monotheistic religions.”114 It follows from this 
position that in requiring students to recite, or even only listen to, the Pledge, the school is 
coercing students to partake in a government-sponsored religious practice in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.
Yet the religious nature of the phrase “under God” may not be as clearly unlawful as 
these proponents made it seem. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her Newdow concurrence, 
the Pledge of Allegiance, even with the “under God” phrase, does not have a discriminatory 
effect; the Pledge “acknowledges religion in a general way: a simple reference to a generic ‘God’ 
.... [it] represents a tolerable attempt to acknowledge religion and to invoke its solemnizing 
power without favoring any individual religious sect or belief system.”115 To hold such a 
generalized invocation of religion unconstitutional may constitute anti-religion hostility in 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause. There is thus a conflict between the free exercise principle 
112 Id.
113
 Amicus Curiae Brief of Americans United For Separation of Church and State, American Civil Liberties Union, 
and Americans For Religious Liberty in Support of Affirmance at *11, Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 
124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (No. 02-1624).
114
 Amicus Curiae Brief of Religious Scholars and Theologians in Support of Respondent at *16, Elk Grove Unified 
School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (No. 02-1624).
115 124 S. Ct. at 2326.
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of preventing anti-religion hostility and the establishment principle of preventing government 
support of religious matters.
The solution to the conflict may be found in the differences between the establishment 
and free exercise analyses. In the free exercise context, a subjective, discriminatory purpose is 
sufficient to invalidate the measure at issue. In the establishment context, the relationship 
between purpose and effect suggests that what is important is the objective purpose (defined in 
terms of an objectively verifiable neutral effect) rather than the subjective motivations of 
disclaimer proponents. As long as the government measure has a neutral primary effect, its 
discriminatory purpose is not problematic. 
However, the Supreme Court has not always defined the establishment purpose analysis 
in this manner, as in some cases, it has chosen to undertake an inquiry into subjective intent. For 
example, the Court analyzed balanced treatment statutes—statutes that mandate equal time for 
evolution and creationism in public school classrooms—in terms of their legislative history.116 In 
a number of other cases the Court looked to the larger history of anti-evolutionism to ascertain 
the purpose of a given anti-evolution measure.117 In these cases, the Court focused on the actual, 
subjective purpose behind the government measure at issue.
In contrast, the Court has in other cases chosen to look to the objective purpose (that is, 
neutral effect) rather than the subjective intent of the legislators. For instance, in a series of cases 
116
 The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987), struck down Louisiana’s balanced 
treatment statute on the basis of its legislative history. During the legislative hearings, the legislative sponsor 
Senator [Bill] Keith stated: “‘My preference would be that neither [creationism nor evolution] be taught’ . . . Such a 
ban on teaching does not promote–indeed, it undermines–the provision of a comprehensive scientific education.” 
482 U.S. at 586-89. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1984), a case dealing with prayer in public schools. 
Among other factors, the statements of the statute’s sponsor in the legislative record and in his testimony before the 
District Court were used to define the statute’s legislative purpose. Id. at 63. In particular, what the Court found 
relevant was the sponsor’s indication that the statute was solely an effort to return voluntary prayer to the public. Id.
117 See, e.g., Selman, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS, at *49.
24
dealing with long-established practices such as Sunday closing laws118 and public Christmas 
displays,119 the Court held the initial religious purpose behind these laws is irrelevant in terms of 
proving an establishment violation.120 As these practices have become so deeply established in 
society, their effect has become secularized, so their primary purpose was deemed secular.121
These two approaches to the secular legislative purpose analysis suggest that although all 
three Lemon prongs have to be met, the Court in some establishment cases is focusing on effect 
as the primary inquiry, while in other cases purpose is the dispositive prong. One cause of 
confusion in establishment jurisprudence is the Court’s labeling of primary effect as an analysis 
into objective purpose. 
Another way of conceptualizing this problem is by seeing the meaning of “secular 
purpose” as plural and non-monolithic.122 Establishment cases demonstrate the definition of 
“secular purpose” is fact-dependent and changes according to the nature of the government 
measure at issue. Therefore in negotiating between free exercise and establishment principles, to 
best protect both establishment and free exercise rights, it appears of paramount importance the 
118 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-5 (1961).
119 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
120
 Consider McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442-5, where “Sunday Blue Laws” were upheld despite their religious roots. 
The Court stated: 
Sunday Closing Laws have become part and parcel of a great governmental concern wholly apart from 
their original purposes or connotations. The present purpose and effect of most of them is to provide a 
uniform day of rest for all citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the 
dominant Christian sects, does not bar the state from achieving its secular goals. To say that the states 
cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries ago such laws had their 
genesis in religion would give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than 
one of mere separation of church and state.
121
 Both of these approaches can be distinguished from the scenario where support for a statute is based on one’s 
religious inclinations. Scott W. Breedlove and Victoria S. Salzmann, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Irrelevance of 
Legislative Motivation Under the Establishment Clause, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 419, 439 (2001). In this case, 
religion serves merely as another source of knowledge. As one’s beliefs can inform one’s choices and actions, to 
forbid the use of religion in this case would be to unconstitutionally disfavor religion and brand it as an illegitimate 
source of truth. Id.
122 See Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM.
AND MARY L. REV. 997, 1005 (1986) (suggesting a “differentiated approach to questions of purpose under the 
religion clauses”).
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definition of “secular purpose” change depending on whether a subjective or objective definition 
is needed.
One way of determining how the establishment prongs work in any given case is to 
compare the government measure at issue with other measures that raise similar free exercise 
dilemmas, then group all such similar measures under the same category, with each category 
determining how the establishment prongs will be applied (the categorical approach). As such, 
the “untainted fruits” category will be proposed as a way to help negotiate the free exercise-
establishment tension implicated in the case of evolution disclaimers.123
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTION DISCLAIMERS
The tension between establishment and free exercise principles is evident regarding 
disclaimers on evolution teaching. As will be demonstrated below,124 evolution disclaimers are 
part of a long history of religious opposition to evolution, which in their present form have the 
effect of discriminating among religions and between religion and non-religion. This history and 
proof of effect raises two important but conflicting considerations: (1) because disclaimers have 
the effect of establishing religion and are motivated by a religious purpose, they are likely 
constitutionally problematic; and (2) because religious parents have a strong, persistent concern 
related to the teaching of evolution in public schools, ignoring this concern altogether may 
constitute anti-religious bias.
This Article will first determine the constitutionality of disclaimers as they stand now. The 
constitutional analysis will provide insight into why a categorical approach generally and an 
123 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
124 See discussion infra Part III.A.
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“untainted fruits” category specifically are needed. The current approach to establishment 
analysis, where the terms “secular purpose” and “effect” are not defined on a fact-specific basis, 
may be inadequately protecting free exercise rights, thus signaling the need for an analytic 
method that can respond to the free exercise elements in establishment cases. Further, the 
analysis will highlight the problems with disclaimers that will later be addressed in the proposed 
generalized disclaimer. 
A. Secular Legislative Purpose  
As described above,125 “secular legislative purpose” requires essentially an analysis of 
intent. The long history of evolution education in public schools reflects the religious purpose 
behind disclaimers on evolution teaching and therefore provides the necessary framework for the 
secular legislative purpose analysis.
As one commentator has pointed out:
Many religious groups have tried to use public schools as a forum to teach ideas 
consistent with their religious beliefs. These efforts have historically taken two forms, 
"the public school presentation of religious doctrine for its religious value and the 
prohibition of teaching material that conflicts with religious doctrine." Prayer in school 
and the posting of the Ten Commandments are examples of public school presentation of 
religious doctrine. The removal of objectionable textbooks stand[s] as an obvious 
example of creationists' efforts to prohibit teaching material that conflicts with religious
doctrine.126
As will become evident from the history of anti-evolution measures in public schools, evolution 
disclaimers are an example of the latter. The “addition of disclaimers to textbooks”127 and/or “the 
125 See supra Part II.A.1.i.
126 Douglas E. Stewart, Jr., Note, Going Back in Time: How the Kansas Board of Education's Removal of Evolution 
from the State Curriculum Violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, 20 REV LITIG. 549, 562 (2001).
127 Id.
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reading of disclaimers after a teacher lectures about evolution”128 is a fallback position of the 
larger effort to allow creationism an “equal chance in the schools.”129
The history of evolution education in public schools can be categorized in terms of three 
methods for giving creationism greater space in public schools.130 The first method, anti-
evolution legislation,131 was exemplified by the Scopes Trial of 1927, which upheld a Tennessee 
statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution in the state’s public schools132 despite the statute’s 
clear purpose of promoting Biblical creationism.133
The Scopes controversy had long-lasting effects: “Textbooks published throughout the 
late 1920s ignored evolutionary biology, and new editions of older volumes deleted the word 
evolution and the name Darwin from their indexes. Some even added religious material.”134
These effects were not countered until after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, sparking 
concerns about America’s technological progress.135 The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study 
(BSCS)136 then discovered that biology education in the U.S. had not been updated for twenty 
128 Id.
129Anti-Defamation League, Teaching Science, Not Dogma: The Creationism Controversy (visited on Jan. 13, 2005) 
<http://www.adl.org/issue_religious_freedom/create/creationism_print.asp>.
130
 Lisa D. Kirkpatrick, Note, Forgetting the Lessons of History: The Evolution of Creationism and Current Trends 
to Restrict the Teaching of Evolution in Public Schools, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 125, 130-41 (2000).
131 Id.
132
 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927). The statute defined evolution as “any theory that denies the story of 
the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible [but instead posits] that man has descended from a lower order of 
animals.” Id. at 364.
133 Id. at 364: 
[T]he Act's title clearly indicates the purpose of the Statute to be the prohibition of teaching in the Schools 
of the State that man has developed or descended from some lower type or order of animals.  When the 
draftsman came to express this purpose in the body of the Act he first forbade the teaching of "any theory 
that denies the story of the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible"—his conception evidently being 
that to forbid the denial of the Bible story would ban the teaching of evolution. To make the purpose more 
explicit he added that it should be unlawful to teach "that man has descended from a lower order of 
animals.”
134 Id.
135 See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff’d, 723 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1983).
136 Id.
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years.137 BSCS published several textbooks including discussion of evolution that eventually 
came to be accepted by “half the biology textbook market.”138
In response to the efforts of BSCS, anti-evolutionists introduced balanced treatment 
statutes.139 These statutes require that if evolution is taught in public schools, then creationism 
should (1) also be taught; and (2) be given treatment equal to that given evolution.140 Moreover, 
anti-evolutionists dubbed creationism “creation science”141 thus implying that creationism 
properly belonged in science classrooms. By 1981, balanced treatment statutes had been 
proposed in twenty-five state legislatures.142 However, in Edwards v Aguillard,143 the Supreme 
Court struck down such statutes as unconstitutional.144
After the defeat of balanced treatment statutes, evolution disclaimers were introduced 
into public school classrooms.145  Viewed within the framework of the creationism-evolution 
battle, it is clear the purpose of these disclaimers is to “restrict evolutionists' influence in public 
schools by disclaiming that evolution is a fact, thereby leaving the possibility of Biblical creation
open.”146
Parents who support disclaimers usually see them as a part of a larger effort to teach 
religious origins theories. For example, the Selman court pointed out that “[e]vidence in the 
record suggests that the idea of placing a sticker in the textbooks originated with parents who 
137
 Kirkpatrick, supra note 130, at 134.
138 Id.
139 See McLean, 529 F. Supp at 1259.
140 See Daniel, 515 F.2d at 487. 
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 Kirkpatrick, supra note 130, at 134.
142 Id.
143 482 U.S. at 587.
144 Id.
145 Edwards was decided in 1987. Seven years later, the Tangipahoa Parish Board in Kansas passed the first 
disclaimer law. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
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 Kirkpatrick, supra note 130, at 137.  See also National Center for Science Education, Antievolutionism and 
Creationism in the United States (visited. Oct. 21, 2004) <http://www.natcenscied.org/resources/articles/4506_ 
antievolutionism_and_creationi_2_13_2001.asp> (“Although antievolutionists pay lip service to supposed scientific 
problems with evolution, what motivates them to battle its teaching is apprehension over the implications of 
evolution for religion.”).
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opposed the presentation of only evolution in science classrooms and sought to have other 
theories, including creation theories, included in the curriculum.”147 The Cobb County, Georgia 
Board of Education drafted its evolution disclaimer “in response to a petition effort that gained 
support via local Bible study classes.”148 One parent was not satisfied, as she wanted the 
disclaimer to “more clearly define alternative explanations” and preferred that it be 
supplemented with “an elective science course exploring the controversy.”149 Another parent was 
blunter in expressing the religious purpose behind the disclaimer: "We believe the Bible is 
correct in that God created man. I don't expect the public school system to teach only 
creationism, but I think it should be given its fair share."150
In addition to promoting consideration of religious creation theories, disclaimers are seen 
as promoting morality as it is understood by religion. As evolutionary theory is seen as amoral, a 
disclaimer that detracts from its credibility is viewed as necessary to the teaching of morality.151
Interestingly, advocates of disclaimers also support the teaching of intelligent design in 
science classrooms.152 Intelligent design theory holds that creation has a purpose and is designed 
by a higher, “intelligent” Being.153 In many respects, intelligent design is a modified version of 
147 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *49 (emphasis added).
148
 People for the American Way, Back to School with the Religious Right (visited Jan. 13, 2005) <http://www. 
pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=3636>. 
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151 Religion, Evolution Revolution (visited Jan. 13, 2005) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/evolution/religion/revolution/
1990.html> (With respect to the tragedy at Columbine High School, Republican Representative Tom DeLay of 
Texas linked the “moral decline specifically to the teaching of evolution: ‘Our school systems teach the children that 
they are nothing but glorified apes who are evolutionized [sic] out of some primordial soup.’ DeLay's accusation, 
while outrageous to many, expresses a common fear anti-evolutionists have voiced for two centuries.”).
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"intelligent design" (ID). The main methods of injecting the ID/creationist agenda into public school curricula are 
via textbook disclaimers and the language of state science standards.”). See also Church Business, Different 
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<http://www. churchbusiness.com/articles/2b1legal.html>, where the author lists intelligent design and textbook 
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teaching both evolution and creation in public schools.”
153 See Wendy F. Hanakahi, Comment, Evolution-Creationism Debate: Evaluating the Constitutionality of Teaching 
Intelligent Design in Public School Classrooms, 25 HAWAII L. REV. 9, 29-30 (2002).
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creationism, and its proposed injection into public schools is roughly equivalent to past attempts 
to teach creationism alongside evolutionary theory.154 That intelligent design garners support 
from the same people who support disclaimers further underscores the fact that disclaimers are 
motivated by the desire to advance religious belief in public schools. 
Consider, for example, Kitzmiller.155 The defendants in the case were the same school 
board members who had previously approved an evolution disclaimer156 and openly admitted 
their religious opposition to the teaching of evolution.157 The court’s opinion in Kitzmiller lays 
out in detail the religious motivations of the board and describes how the evolution disclaimer 
outlining intelligent design theory emerged from a series of board retreats where members 
discussed the importance of teaching creationism.158
Although the defendants in cases such as Freiler, Selman, and Kitzmiller presented other 
purposes for their disclaimers, the court in each of those cases made clear that all purported 
Intelligent design "assumes the work is too complex to be anything but the plan of an intelligent agent." 
This theory differs from the classical creationism version of the origin of life. First, intelligent design 
accepts the belief in an "old" earth, while creationism adopts the Biblical narrative of the earth's creation by 
"God." Intelligent design is also more "theologically diverse" than creationism, a belief held primarily by 
Fundamentalist and Evangelical Christians. Furthermore, intelligent design advocates describe the theory as 
"a new program for scientific research," while creationism lacks a research program. Despite these 
differences between intelligent design and creationism, however, intelligent design still differs notably 
from the theory of evolution, which attributes the complexity and diversity in the world to natural causes, 
not to the design of an intelligent agent.
154 Id.
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are far closer to Young Earth Creationism, which holds that God created the world 6,000 years ago and that 
Noah's flood covered Earth, than to intelligent design. One board member told a public meeting—in a 
remark he has since tried to deny—that the nation “was founded on Christianity, and our students should be 
taught as such.”
158 Kitzmiller, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *120.
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purposes must be genuine.159 One alleged purpose was that the disclaimers were meant to quell 
the concerns of parents who for religious reasons did not want their children to learn about 
evolutionary theory.160 Admittedly, responding to the concerns of religious parents is a 
legitimate, secular purpose161 (as it neither hinders nor promotes religious belief), and 
constitutionally permissible ways in which this can be done will be discussed below.162 Yet in 
the case of anti-evolution measures, the Court has looked for the actual, subjective purpose of the 
statute, and in determining whether an alleged purpose is the actual purpose of the statute, the 
Court has taken into account the process by which a particular disclaimer was developed.163
Specifically, the Court has used the views expressed in the legislative history of a statute to 
define the statute’s legislative purpose.164
For example, the Louisiana disclaimer was the brainchild of the Louisiana Family Forum 
(LFF), a Christian fundamentalist organization that has sponsored “Citizens for School Prayer” 
rallies165 and touts as an accomplishment its intervention “in Louisiana's science textbook review 
and adoption process.”166 Specifically, the LFF has made several presentations “about the many 
factual errors contained in proposed textbooks, particularly concerning the theory of macro-
evolution.”167 The organization’s purpose in proposing the evolution disclaimer is evident from 
159 See, e.g., Freiler, 185 F.3d at 343 (the “avowed purposes” must be “sincere and not a sham”).
160 Id. Another alleged purpose was to “encourage informed freedom of belief.”  Id. As will be demonstrated, this is 
an inherently problematic assertion in the public school context. See discussion infra Part III.
161 See id. at 345 (“reducing student/parent offense” is a permissible secular objective “that the School Board could 
rightly address”).
162 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
163 See infra note 169.  
164 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-89.
165
 Jones, supra note 4, at 534.
166
 Louisiana Family Forum, 2002 Accomplishments (visited Sept. 19, 2004) <http://www.lafamilyforum.org/>.  
167 Id.
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its mission statement: “[t]o persuasively present biblical principles in the centers of influence on 
issues affecting the family through research, communication, and networking.”168
In addition to the history of specific statutes, the history of anti-evolutionism in general 
has helped the Supreme Court to determine the purpose of anti-evolution measures. For example, 
in Epperson v. Arkansas,169 the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a statute 
forbidding the teaching of evolution in public schools, colleges and universities.170 The Court’s 
opinion noted the statute “was a product of the upsurge of  'fundamentalist' religious fervor of the 
twenties. The Arkansas statute was an adaption [sic] of the famous Tennessee 'monkey law' 
which that State adopted in 1925.”171 In striking down the statute as unconstitutional, the Court 
said: 
In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers 
from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some that 
the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No 
suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by considerations of state 
policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens.172
Similarly, the Selman court used the long history of anti-evolutionism to support its 
conclusion regarding the unconstitutionality of the Cobb disclaimer.173 Regarding the disclaimer, 
which read, "evolution is a theory, not a fact, concerning the origin of living things,”174 the court 
said:
[T]he first problem with this language is that there has been a lengthy debate between 
advocates of evolution and proponents of religious theories of origin specifically 
concerning whether evolution should be taught as a fact or as a theory, and the School 
168
 Louisiana Family Forum, Mission Statement (visited Sept. 19, 2004) <http://www.lafamilyforum.org> (emphasis 
added).  
169
 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
170 Id. at 98-99. “The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university ‘to 
teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,’ or ‘to adopt or use 
in any such institution a textbook that teaches’ this theory.” 
171 Id. at 98.
172 Id. at 107.
173 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *62.
174 Id.
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Board appears to have sided with the proponents of religious theories of origin in 
violation of the Establishment Clause. As the Supreme Court stated in County of 
Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union, “... the Establishment Clause, at the very 
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious 
belief," and this is exactly what the School Board appears to have done.175
As this evidence demonstrates, instead of merely responding to the concerns of religious 
parents, disclaimers serve religious groups by casting doubt on a theory these groups find 
troublesome.176 Therefore the historical evidence satisfies both the subjective and objective 
purpose inquiries. On the one hand, the history of anti-evolutionism proves the actual, subjective 
intent behind evolution disclaimers is to undermine the credibility of evolutionary theory in order 
to strengthen the credibility of creationism. The history also satisfies the objective purpose 
inquiry by showing that regardless of subjective intent, the objective purpose behind disclaimers 
must be unconstitutional by virtue of the fact that disclaimers continue a long series of anti-
evolution efforts that themselves were deemed unconstitutional. 
However, the question is whether the relation between current disclaimers and past anti-
evolution efforts should be enough to invalidate the former. As the discussion of the “primary 
effect” prong will demonstrate,177 disclaimers as they stand now are unconstitutional independent 
of the history of religious anti-evolution efforts because they single out certain belief systems for 
favorable treatment. The compromise between free exercise and establishment principles 
mandates that although raising epistemological concerns about scientific theories may be a 
legitimate educational objective, for a disclaimer that does this to be constitutionally permissible, 
175 Id. at 62-63. “Just as citizens around the country have been aware of the historical debate between evolution and 
religion, an informed, reasonable observer in this case would be keenly aware of the sequence of events that 
preceded the adoption of the Sticker.” Id. at 60. (internal citation omitted).
176
 Hanakahi, supra note 153, at 50 (“[C]onsideration of the larger history would reveal that the purpose of a 
disclaimer is to diminish the teaching of evolution because it contradicts the creationist view. This is an improper 
religious purpose under the Lemon test, and a disclaimer is therefore unconstitutional.”).
177 See discussion infra Part III.B.
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it must do so without compromising government neutrality toward religion.178 Arguably then, a 
disclaimer that serves religious concerns without discriminating among religions, or between 
religion and non-religion, may be constitutional despite its relation to previous religious attempts 
at countering the teaching of evolution.  
B. Primary Effect  
The “primary effect” analysis of evolution disclaimers asks whether such disclaimers 
endorse either a particular religious viewpoint or religion in general.179 The emphasis is on bias, 
promotion, or favoritism.180 In considering evolution disclaimers under this test, a number of 
factors indicate such bias.  
First, as evolution is the only academic subject preceded by a disclaimer, the selectivity 
of this approach suggests favoritism toward religion.181 As the plaintiffs in Selman noted about 
the Cobb disclaimer:
Evolution is the only theory mentioned in the Sticker, and there is no sticker placed in 
textbooks related to any other theory, topic, or subject covered in the Cobb County 
School District's curriculum … However, there are other scientific topics taught that have 
religious implications, such as the theories of gravity, relativity, and Galilean 
hehocentrism [sic].182
178 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
179 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
180 See Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 764 (1995) (“‘Endorsement’ connotes an expression or 
demonstration of approval or support. Our cases have accordingly equated ‘endorsement’ with ‘promotion’ or 
‘favoritism.’”). 
181
 It should be noted that disclaimers are markedly different from religious measures classified as “ceremonial 
deism.” Unlike the latter acts, which Justice Brennan defined in Lynch as “protected from Establishment Clause
scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content," evolution 
disclaimers are a relatively new phenomenon and are still charged with religious significance.  465 U.S. at 716.
182
 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *14. “[T]he Sticker targets only evolution to be approached with an open mind, 
carefully studied, and critically considered without explaining why it is the only theory being isolated as such.” Id. at 
*68.
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Moreover, this selectivity is not viewpoint-neutral, as evolution may be offensive to only certain
religions while being neutral or even favorable to other religious beliefs. For example, as 
evolutionary theory may be offensive to Christians but not to Hindus,183 requiring a disclaimer in 
association with the teaching of evolution may constitute favoritism among religions.184
Even though other scientific (or, for that matter, historical or literary) ideas may be 
offensive to some religions,185 evolution alone is selected for special treatment.186 For example, 
the fact the majority of students are Christian rather than Hindu does not affect the 
unconstitutionality of the disclaimer.187  Rather, it provides even more reason to prohibit such 
183 See Hinduism and the Evolution of Life (visited Oct. 4, 2004) <http://www.hinduwebsite.com/evolution.htm>: 
Hinduism believes in the concept of evolution of life on earth. Although it is not the same as the one known 
to modern science, in many ways and in a very fundamental sense, it is not much different from the latter. 
Modern science speaks of physical evolution and the evolution of nervous system, starting with simple life 
forms and proceeding to more organized and complex beings with well developed and self-regulating 
biological and mental mechanisms. Man is so far the known and the ultimate product of this very complex 
and continuous process.  Hinduism, on the other hand, places its emphasis on the mental and spiritual 
evolution of life on earth. It speaks of evolution of the beings from a state of ignorance to a state of 
illumination through progressive and successive intermediate states of partial ignorance and partial 
illumination. 
184
 Requiring disclaimers may also favor theist religions and philosophies over deist ones. Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary defines “theism” as “belief in the existence of a god or gods; specifically: belief in the existence of one 
God viewed as the creative source of man and the world who transcends yet is immanent in the world,” and “deism” 
as “a movement or system of thought advocating natural religion, emphasizing morality, and in the 18th century 
denying the interference of the Creator with the laws of the universe.”  (visited Oct. 11, 2004) <http://www.m-
w.com/>. Deism acknowledges God’s existence, but disagrees with theist religions about God’s role or nature. The 
limited role ascribed to God by deism fits with the suggestion in evolutionary theory that once the universe was 
created and set in motion, the process of evolution, or natural selection, determined the course of life from that point 
onwards. Synthetic Theory of Evolution, Natural Selection (visited Oct. 15, 2004) <http://anthro.palomar.edu/ 
synthetic/synth_7.htm> (“Natural selection is usually the most important mechanism of evolution.”). This idea of 
life as dependent on physical laws rather than on an interactive Creator is the antithesis of the theist notion of an 
immanent Creator. 
185
 Consider, for example, the case of pacifist religions such as Quakerism and Mennonitism, which may be against 
the teaching of literary works that depict violence.  
186 See supra note 32. Jeffrey Selman, the parent-plaintiff who initiated the lawsuit, “said placing advisories in 
science texts is an attempt to inject religion into public schools. ‘Why single out evolution? It has to be coming from 
a religious basis, and that violates the separation of church and state.’” Similarly, Michael Manley, attorney for the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), noted: “‘Why are they singling out evolution? Because from a creationist's 
standpoint, they don't have a problem with the theory of gravity.’”
187
 On petition for a rehearing en banc, the dissent in Freiler argued that because “ninety-five percent of the students 
in Tangipahoa Parish believed in Biblical Creation,” the disclaimer’s exclusive mention of the Biblical theory of 
origins served merely “to give context to the message.” Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 201 F.3d 602, 
604 (5th Cir. 2000). This argument clearly did not solve the disclaimer’s constitutional problems.
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disclaimers as they favor the majority religion (Christianity) over minority religions.188  In 
addition, the singling out of evolution alone to be preceded by a disclaimer suggests a preference 
of religion over non-religion and of those religious groups wielding greater political power over 
those that do not have power.189 Significantly, the Supreme Court made clear in Lynch v 
Donnelly190 that because such preference is politically problematic, it is unconstitutional:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion 
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. . . . [Governmental 
endorsement of religion] sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that 
they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the 
opposite message.191
This favoritism may be subtle. For instance, in Freiler, the disclaimer not only made 
specific mention of Biblical theory, but also juxtaposed a disavowal of evolution with 
encouragement of students to contemplate alternative origin theories.192 The court held this 
combination promoted belief in religious theories at the expense of scientific ones.193 Moreover, 
the Court interpreted the disclaimer’s reminder to students that they had the right to maintain the 
188 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry.”). 
189
 Moreover, favoring the religious beliefs of Christianity supports the idea of a “Christian America,” that is, the 
idea of America as a Christian country. Stephen M. Feldman, Book Review, Principle, History, and Power: The 
Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1072 (1996). See also Joseph R. 
Duncan, Jr., Commentary, Privilege, Invisibility, and Religion: A Critique of the Privilege that Christianity Has 
Enjoyed in the United States, 54 ALA. L. REV. 617 (2003) (“In the United States, Christians are privileged. Despite 
a constitutional guarantee that the government will be faceless when concerning religion, a system has developed 
that has absorbed Christian practice at every turn.”).
190 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
191 Id. at 687-88. This concern was echoed by the Selman court when it considered the primary effect of the Cobb 
disclaimer: 
[T]he Sticker sends a message to those who oppose evolution for religious reasons that they are favored 
members of the political community, while the Sticker sends a message to those who believe in evolution 
that they are political outsiders. This is particularly so in a case such as this one involving impressionable 
public school students who are likely to view the message on the Sticker as a union of church and state.
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *59.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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beliefs taught to them by their parents as specifically encouraging religious views.194 Taken 
together, these aspects of the disclaimer violated the “primary effect” prong of the Lemon test.195
It may be argued that the prohibition of evolution disclaimers does not promote neutrality 
among religious viewpoints or between religion and non-religion, because it reflects a dogmatic 
approach toward evolution and hostility toward religion.196 Although this concern may be valid, 
evolution-specific disclaimers are not the solution. A more appropriate response would be to 
create a generalized disclaimer that responds to religious concerns without compromising 
government neutrality.197 Permissible objectives can include increasing awareness of the nature 
of the scientific enterprise and sources of knowledge; generalized disclaimers that present this 
information can help students think critically about science and inquiry—including evolutionary
theory—without singling out evolution for special treatment.  
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR FREE EXERCISE ELEMENTS 
IN THE DISCLAIMER CASE STUDY
The history of anti-evolutionism and the specific legislative history of various anti-
evolution measures show the objective purpose of evolution disclaimers as they stand now is to 
establish religion. Although this Article has concluded that disclaimers on evolution teaching are 
constitutionally problematic, it will argue this same history suggests the inquiry should not be 
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See DeMott, supra note 26, at 611  (In Freiler, “the court implicitly found that there is a wall of separation 
between science and religion. In so deciding, the court assumed the inerrancy of science and the irrationality of 
religion without considering which discipline is best suited to determine the origin of life and matter.”). See also
MSNBC.com, Alex Johnson, “Intelligent Design” faces first big court test: Parents sue after alternate to evolution 
added to science curriculum (visited Dec. 15, 2005) <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9444600/from/RL.2> (The 
Discovery Institute, a think-tank in Seattle, “criticized the ACLU for pursuing an ‘Orwellian’ stifling of scientific 
debate”).
197 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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thus limited; that is, the establishment analysis should not preclude scrutiny of the free exercise 
elements involved. Because religious parents have strong feelings about the issue of evolution 
teaching in public schools, the question becomes whether these feelings can be addressed by 
other means, or whether any means at all will be constitutionally invalid simply by virtue of its 
being connected to the problematic history of religious anti-evolutionism.
C. Evolution Toward Neutrality: Generalized Disclaimers
As a solution to the free exercise-establishment tension in the current form of disclaimers, 
this Part proposes a generalized disclaimer. The aim is to rectify the constitutional flaws with the 
form of the disclaimer itself, thus addressing the discriminatory effect of disclaimers, an effort 
based on the need to protect the legitimate free exercise principles that are implicated in the case 
of disclaimers in general—that is, the desire of religious parents to raise epistemological 
concerns about evolutionary theory.
The proposed generalized disclaimer is one that would concede the non-absolute nature 
of science and scientific theories without singling out evolutionary theory.  The religious parents 
who contest the teaching of evolutionary theory sometimes characterize evolution as a dogma of 
the “religion of humanism”198, in other words claiming that secularism is a religion in its own 
right. Although this characterization of secularism as religion may be flawed in a number of 
198
 Sheila Jasanoff, Biology and the Bill of Rights: Can Science Reframe The Constitution?, 13 AM. J.L. AND 
MED. 249, 286-87 (1987): 
A perception of this inescapable conflict may explain the recent attacks on the concept of “secular 
humanism” by fundamentalist public school students. In early 1987, for example, a federal district judge in 
Alabama banned a wide range of public school textbooks on the ground that their failure to pay sufficient 
attention to the significance of religion in America and their treatment of morality as a matter of personal 
choice impermissibly promoted the religion of secular humanism.
See also Is “Secular Humanism” a “Religion”? (visited Nov. 27, 2005) <http://members.aol.com/Patriarchy/definit
ions/humanism_religion.htm>.
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ways,199 the underlying concern regarding dogmatism can be addressed by a disclaimer that 
places science and scientific inquiry in a realist200 framework.
Such a disclaimer may, for instance, describe the uniquely human nature of scientific 
discovery and explain how scientists, as humans, are necessarily both constrained by their 
physical and mental capacities and shaped by their background beliefs: “The world we humans 
inhabit is not brute nature, but nature modified by our physical activities and overlaid by our 
semiotic webs, including the imaginative constructions of writers and artists, and the 
explanations, descriptions, and theories of detectives, historians, theologians, etc.—and of 
scientists.”201 What scientists think is relevant or worth discovering will influence the data they 
collect and even the serendipitous discoveries they may stumble upon. For instance, the corpus 
of scientific knowledge and the current form of scientific methodology will determine for 
scientists which unusual occurrence is important enough to note, or what is “unusual” to begin 
with.202
For instance, the disclaimer can relay the story of Galileo or other inventors who 
recognized the importance of the discoveries they stumbled upon only because of their training. 
For instance, when Galileo turned his telescope on Venus and saw that Venus showed distinct 
“phases,” he knew to relate that to the Moon orbiting the Earth, and from thence discovered that 
199 Is Humanism the Answer? (visited Nov. 27, 2005) <http://www.mwillett.org/atheism/humanism1.htm>.
200
 God, Humanity, and the Cosmos, Critical Realism in Science and Religion (visited Nov. 27, 2006)
<http://www.meta-library.net/ghc-outl/criti-body.html> 
We revert to assessing a more sophisticated form of realism, frequently referred to as “critical realism”. 
The critical realist holds that there is a progressive closening between our views of reality and reality itself, 
but recognises that we hold our views provisionally, that we cannot simply read off the nature of the world 
from scientific data. The theories and presuppositions with which we approach our studies are 
acknowledged to affect our selection of what data we count as important to collect, as well as the ways in 
which we interpret these data. For example, simple measurements using something as basic as an electricity 
meter rest upon commitments to theories about interactions between current-carrying conductors and 
magnetic fields. Experimental data are never other than theory-laden, and there is never enough data totally 
to demonstrate every element of a theory. Other reasons for adopting a critical approach take into account 
the fact that observations themselves affect the character of an entity as it is observed.
201 SUSAN HAACK. DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON. 123 (2003).
202 Id.
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Venus orbits the Sun in similar fashion.203 From this fact, Galileo was able to expand out and 
hypothesize that because “Venus orbited the Sun [and], small moons orbited Jupiter … it was 
more natural to believe that the Earth itself orbited the Sun.”204 Galileo’s previous knowledge 
directed him to look out for certain things and to distinguish certain sights as unusual and worthy 
of further research and analysis.  If the corpus of knowledge and existing scientific controversies 
were different, Galileo perhaps would have overlooked the “phases” of Venus, just as he may 
well have overlooked other things that were visible through his telescope that today may be 
considered scientifically valuable.
Assumptions and epistemological frameworks thus shape and constrain the scientific 
enterprise, perhaps in more obvious ways than they do in other knowledge areas.  A disclaimer 
that encourages students to explore the role background assumptions play in the process of 
intellectual inquiry will serve a secular purpose, as is required by the Establishment Clause. To 
disentangle how scientists’ knowledge of the physical is necessarily shaped by the tools they use 
and the beliefs they hold is to think critically; therefore the laying out of such a philosophical 
framework will serve the secular purpose of encouraging critical thinking. 
Moreover, science is based on observation of the physical and collection of empirical 
data. It is therefore constrained by the limited capacity of the sensory organs with which humans 
interact with the world. 
Our sensory organs put us in touch with things and events in the world, but our senses are 
limited, imperfect, and sometimes distorted by our expectations; and there is no cleanly 
identifiable class of purely observational statements, or of observable things.  There are 
real kinds; but this is only to say that some knots of properties are held together by laws. 
There are objective truths, and the sciences sometimes succeed in discovering some of 
them; but truth is not transparent, and progress is not guaranteed.205
203 Galileo (visited Dec. 25, 2005) <http://burro.astr.cwru.edu/JavaLab/MoonsWeb/backGalileo.html>.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 124.
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A generalized disclaimer that describes such limitations of science is not necessarily 
pointing to larger metaphysical truths, but is simply describing perception realistically. To 
describe intellectual inquiry in this manner is to prevent a dogmatic approach to science that is 
intrinsically hostile to religion. 
Previous disclaimers that have been enacted and struck down as unconstitutional provide 
some guidance on the linguistics of the generalized disclaimer. For instance, downplaying 
scientific theories by manipulating lay connotations of “theory” would lead students to consider 
any scientific theory presented in class as unsupported by substantial empirical evidence.  
Further, current disclaimers encourage students to “keep an open mind” and think critically, but 
the nature of the generalized disclaimer is that it encourages students to think critically without 
saying so explicitly. Relaying anecdotes of actual scientists and their process of discovery gives 
an accurate picture of the scientific enterprise without suggesting that students should doubt the 
information presented in class.
For those parents who are concerned that schools are indoctrinating their children 
regarding a false theory, such a generalized disclaimer may respond to their concerns as it opens 
up the possibility that evolutionary theory is a product of limited capacities. However, it is 
debatable whether a generalized disclaimer would serve religious needs to the satisfaction of 
evolution disclaimers’ original proponents because it does not single out evolutionary theory. If 
the only disclaimer that serves these proponents’ needs is one limited to evolutionary theory, 
then it becomes even more evident that evolution disclaimers have an improper religious 
purpose. On the other hand, acceptance of the generalized disclaimer by these proponents does 
not compromise its neutrality.206
206
 An even more generalized disclaimer would explain the nature of inquiry generally, rather than focus on 
scientific inquiry alone. However, it appears that focusing on science as a whole is generalized enough to meet the 
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D. The Jurisprudential Solution: The “Untainted Fruits of the Poisonous Tree” Approach
1. Variety v. Unity
The tension between the clauses is built into establishment jurisprudence, which can 
essentially be condensed down to the establishment tests’ main prongs of “secular purpose” and 
“primary effect.” In developing a jurisprudential approach that accounts for legitimate free 
exercise elements, the very nature of the establishment tests and the prongs’ definitions are at 
issue, with the definitions varying according to the specific facts of the case.
Consider, for example, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Board of Education of Kiryas 
Joel Village School District v. Grumet,207 a case in which the Court reaffirmed the prohibition 
against singling out a particular religious group for disparate treatment. A plurality of the justices 
held that a state statute constituting a village occupied only by Hasidic Jews as a separate public 
school district was based on religious favoritism and thus was not neutral between religion and 
non-religion or among religions. According to the Court, if the statute had been a generalized 
one that gave Kiryas Joel “its authority ... ‘simply as one of many communities eligible for equal 
treatment under the law,’" the statute would likely have been constitutional.208 In her 
concurrence, O’Connor noted: 
constitutional standard. See Kitzmiller, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *49. In its discussion of how the intelligent design 
disclaimer has an impermissible effect because it singles out evolutionary theory, the court says, “[t]he evidence in 
this case reveals that Defendants do not mandate a similar pronouncement about any other aspect of the biology 
curriculum or the curriculum for any other course.”  The court’s statement suggests that if other, or all, aspects of the 
biology curriculum were addressed by the disclaimer, the disclaimer’s effect may well be constitutionally 
permissible. 
207 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
208
 Stephanie E. Russell, Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause Tests, Looking Past the Lemon, 60 MO.
L. REV. 653, 664 (1995): 
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Because this benefit was given to this group based on its religion, it seems proper to treat 
it as a legislatively drawn religious classification. I realize this is a close question, 
because the Satmars may be the only group who currently need this particular 
accommodation. The legislature may well be acting without any favoritism, so that if 
another group came to ask for a similar district, the group might get it on the same terms 
as the Satmars.209
O’Connor goes on to focus on the need for diverse establishment tests, with the 
definitions of “effect” and “purpose” dependent on the facts of each case. She insisted that a 
“Grand Unified Theory”210 does not address adequately the range of cases that fall under the 
Establishment Clause.211 Although the primary aim of establishment analysis is to look for an 
improper discriminatory purpose and effect, the manner of the inquiry may vary according to the 
nature of the specific case.212
[S]etting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than 
good. Any test that must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so vague as to 
be useless . . . Moreover, shoehorning new problems into a test that does not reflect the 
special concerns raised by those problems tends to deform the language of the test.213
Some may see O’Connor’s recommendation of a non-unified test as further exacerbating 
the confusion surrounding establishment jurisprudence.214 However, as will be seen below, a 
focus on facts may actually make the doctrine more comprehensible and predictable.215
For instance, an act written broadly to apply to any group that meets certain criteria would describe the 
standards a group would have to meet to receive the benefit of the act. On the other hand, a "series of 
special acts" would provide examples of the kinds of organizations that were eligible.
209 512 U.S. at 716.
210 Id. at 718.
211 Id. (“Any test that must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so vague as to be useless.”).
212 Id. at 719: “Relatively simple phrases like ‘primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion’ and 
‘entanglement’ . . . acquire more and more complicated definitions which stray ever further from their literal 
meaning.”
213 Id. at 718-19.
214 See Russell, supra note 208, at 672. On Scalia’s dissent in Grumet: “Justice O’Connor’s recommendation, he 
thought, would leave the Court with no guidelines and would instead ‘announce that we are now so bold that we no 
longer feel the need even to pretend that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any 
principle.’”
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Significantly, O’Connor frames her argument in terms of religious concerns: 
Religious needs can be accommodated through laws that are neutral with regard to 
religion . . . . What makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is not that the 
government is making life easier for some particular religious group as such. Rather, it is 
that the government is accommodating a deeply held belief. Accommodations may thus 
justify treating those who share this belief differently from those who do not; but they do 
not justify discriminations based on sect.216
O’Connor distinguishes permissible accommodation of religious practices from impermissible 
favoritism toward religious groups. Favoritism implies government endorsement of religious 
views, either religion over non-religion or among religious viewpoints. On the other hand, 
accommodation, on the other hand, does not establish religion but simply serves to protect rather 
than hinder or punish the free exercise of religion. As such, cases upholding concessions to 
religion are a good place to start in evaluating the way in which establishment analysis turns on 
specific facts. 
For example, in Lynch the Court upheld the constitutionality of a city's Christmas 
display,217 stating that it was justified by a secular purpose—taking “note of a significant 
historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World.”218 On its face, a government-
sponsored display directly connected to a religious holiday appears to be the quintessential 
establishment violation. Yet the Court was reluctant to disallow a display that served a valid 
secular purpose simply because it was related to a particular set of religious beliefs. For the 
Court, it was the objective purpose rather than the subjective intent behind the original use of 
Christmas displays that was dispositive.
215 See Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM.
AND MARY L. REV. 997, 1005 (1986) (suggesting a “differentiated approach to questions of purpose under the 
religion clauses”).
216 512 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added).
217 465 U.S. 668.
218 Id. at 687.
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Similarly, in her concurrence in Lynch, Justice O’Connor pointed out that the direct 
religious reference in the “statutorily prescribed national motto ‘In God We Trust’”219 was not 
enough to invalidate a government measure; what mattered was the objective purpose of the 
measure and its secular effect. In the same concurrence, O’Connor defined the purpose and effect 
prongs as not forbidding the “advancement or inhibition of religion”;220 rather, “[w]hat is crucial 
is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to 
status in the political community.”221 Thus, a permissible accommodation may be distinguished 
from an impermissible advancement of religion on the basis of its political significance (or lack 
thereof)—that is, whether it reflects government endorsement or disapproval of religion.
In determining whether a given measure constitutes a permissible accommodation or an 
establishment of religion, the perspective of the objective, reasonable observer is of central 
importance. How the measure is perceived by an objective observer is dependent on its primary 
effect; if the measure does not discriminate among religions or convey a religious message, its 
purpose—measured according to objective observations rather than subjective intent—will be 
secular.222
2. Losing the “Taint”: Generalized Disclaimers as the Hypothetical Untainted 
Fruit
219 Id. at 693.
220 Id. at 692.
221 Id.
222 See Kitzmiller, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *47-80 (discussing purpose according to how the objective observer 
would perceive it).
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Government measures falling under the “untainted fruits” category are those that present a 
unique factual scenario and a correspondingly unique question: whether they are permissible 
despite being rooted in a history of legislation motivated by impermissible purposes. That is to 
say, despite their being “fruits of the poisonous tree,” can these measures be purged of their 
historical taint?
Generalized disclaimers are an example of one such government measure. If enacted, 
they will have a neutral, non-discriminatory effect, but if the analysis of their purpose takes into 
account the history of anti-evolutionist measures, then generalized disclaimers may well be 
constitutionally invalidated on that basis. The fact-based categorical approach is one that allows 
for the definition of “secular purpose” to be tailored to the unique free exercise elements of a
given government measure. In the case of measures falling under the untainted fruits approach, 
this unique free exercise element is the fact that they are products of a long history that reflects 
the genuine religious concerns of a group of citizens. Whereas a non-fact-based approach may 
disregard this persistent concern because it is not adequately focused on how free exercise 
principles are intertwined with the facts of the case, the categorical approach generally and the 
“untainted fruits” category specifically will negotiate adequately between the free exercise and 
establishment principles involved.
The differentiating element between government measures falling under the “untainted 
fruits” category and those falling under other sorts of categories would be a definition of “secular 
purpose” that is more attuned to the unique free exercise elements of measures that are “fruits of 
the poisonous tree.” Therefore, the constitutional determination depends on which definition of 
“secular purpose” applies to the “untainted fruits” category. Using generalized disclaimers as an 
illustration, if the “sham purpose” inquiry applies to generalized disclaimers, then the 
47
constitutionally problematic history of anti-evolutionism may be enough to invalidate 
generalized disclaimers despite their religiously-neutral effect (although, as mentioned above,223
invalidating generalized disclaimers on this basis may breach free exercise rights). If however, 
what matters is the objective purpose (or primary effect), then government measures such as 
generalized disclaimers that fall within the “untainted fruits” category can be constitutional 
despite their relation to a history of unconstitutional measures as long as the modified form has 
truly lost the religious taint of its original source (that is, their primary effect has become 
neutralized).  Such measures may still serve religious concerns, but only incidentally. 
Overall, the untainted fruits approach serves to bring the primary effect analysis to the 
forefront and to define “secular purpose” in objective rather than subjective terms. Determining 
whether generalized disclaimers (and measures like them) should be analyzed for their objective 
purpose requires sorting through a number of intricate factual questions. When analyzed 
alongside cases of permissible accommodation (that is, cases where the objective purpose 
analysis is used), it is apparent that generalized disclaimers are both similar and different in 
important ways. For example, the Christmas display in Lynch is a measure that over time has 
become so deeply established in society that its primary purpose is no longer religious, but 
secular.224 The essential difference between these types of deeply ingrained practices and 
223 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
224
 Tushnet, supra note 122, at 1003-04.  This category covers something akin to “ceremonial deism.” See Richard 
F. Suhrheinrich and T. Melindah Bush, The Ohio Motto Survives the Establishment Clause, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 585, 
588 (2003) (“Ceremonial deism, then, considers the country's traditional invocations of religion to determine 
whether the challenged government action falls within that permitted tradition. By contrast, under the endorsement 
test, government conduct is unconstitutional if, at the very least, a "reasonable observer" would view it as endorsing 
one religion over another.”). Consider the case of McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442-45, where “Sunday Blue Laws” were 
upheld despite their religious roots. The Court stated: 
The Establishment Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely 
happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions ... Sunday Closing Laws have 
become part and parcel of a great governmental concern wholly apart from their original purposes or 
connotations. The present purpose and effect of most of them is to provide a uniform day of rest for all 
citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the dominant Christian sects, 
does not bar the state from achieving its secular goals. To say that the states cannot prescribe Sunday as a 
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generalized disclaimers is that the former have become purged of their religious roots through 
the passage of time. In contrast, the evolution controversy has not lost its religious significance, 
and generalized disclaimers, if used, will for a long time be an innovation rather than a time-
worn practice.225 It is not the passage of time but the modification in form and substance that sets 
generalized disclaimers apart from their constitutionally problematic origins.
On the other hand, deeply ingrained practices and generalized disclaimers are importantly 
similar in that they involve community values that overlap with religious values. Like deeply 
ingrained practices, generalized disclaimers serve purposes other than responding to the religious 
sentiments of certain groups. Encouraging critical thinking and educating students about theories 
and sources of knowledge can be a legitimate and beneficial goal of educational institutions 
(such as public schools),226 one that is acceptable to evolution’s supporters and detractors and to 
religious and non-religious groups alike. 
Also important is the fact that public schools, as agents of the state, are limited in the 
extent to which they can interfere with a parent’s right to instill religion in his/her children. A 
line of parent-state rights cases has held that a “‘custodial parent has a constitutional right to 
determine, without undue interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture and educate the 
child.’”227 A generalized disclaimer can help protect this constitutional right by limiting the 
indoctrination of children in what is often called the religion of “humanism” or anti-religion.228
day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries ago such laws had their genesis in religion would 
give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere separation of 
church and state.
225
 Distinguishing these two categories may require the Court to determine how long it takes for a religious measure 
to become secularized and what it means for something to lose its religious significance.
226 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
227
 William G. Ross, Symposium, Education and The Constitution: Shaping Each Other and the Next Century: The 
Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L.
REV.  177, 182-33 (2000).
228
 Michael R. O'Neill, Government's Denigration of Religion: Is God the Victim of Discrimination in Our Public 
Schools? 21 PEPP. L. REV. 478, 501 (1994).
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Preventing the endorsement of anti-religion and limiting state interference in parental rights are 
other values that can be supported by religious and non-religious groups alike. Significantly, if 
“secular purpose” is defined to take into account the secular objectives served by generalized 
disclaimers, then these disclaimers will be better able to withstand establishment scrutiny.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the criteria for measures being classified under the 
“untainted fruits” category and being adjudicated as “untainted” are: (1) these measures are 
rooted in an unconstitutional source; (2) the current version of the measure is a fundamentally 
modified version of its original version, that is, its primary effect is no longer unconstitutionally 
discriminatory; (3) these measures serve one or more secular purposes; (4) despite the fact that 
the primary effect of the measure is no longer unconstitutional, these measures are different from 
deeply established practices in that their origins are still religiously controversial; and (5) this 
religiously controversial original source reflects strong religious interests such that a subjective 
definition of “secular purpose” would implicate and likely violate free exercise interests.
3. Losing the “Taint”: Case Law
i. Grumet.
The untainted fruits approach is a novel suggestion that does not have jurisprudential 
precedent. However, the subsequent history of the statute at issue in Grumet is a case study in 
how the untainted fruits approach may be employed,229 as the same case that provoked Justice 
O’Connor’s suggestion for a fact-based analysis provides an interesting vantage point from 
which to analyze how the process of modification may work. Moreover, the subsequent history 
of the Grumet statute shows that, without the “untainted fruits” category, courts may remain 
229
 512 U.S. 687.
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uncertain about how to negotiate between establishment and free exercise principles in this 
unique type of scenario.230
As mentioned above, the statute in Grumet served to designate as a separate public school 
district a village occupied only by Hasidic Jews. The decision to create this separate school 
district was based on special educational challenges faced by some of the handicapped Hasidic 
children.231 These handicapped children were unable to receive remedial classes in their private 
religious schools and were forced to go to public schools for these classes.232 In these public 
schools, these children were taunted because of their different language, dress, and religious 
practices.233 In order to provide state funding for these children without forcing them to endure 
the ridicule they faced in public schools, the state created a separate school district encompassing 
only the Hasidic village.234
This statute was challenged, and eventually invalidated, as unconstitutionally establishing 
religion because it singled out a religious group for special treatment.235 After the Supreme Court 
struck down the statute, the state attempted to pass a broader, more generalized version of the 
statute such that in applying for a school district, the eligibility criteria were not religious.236 By 
opening up eligibility to a larger number of people, the statute was meant to be generalized 
enough to pass establishment scrutiny. 
230
 The fruits approach will help accommodate the strong religious interests reflected in Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 
(1997), and its subsequent history, whereas without it such interests may be ignored. See Mark D. van der Laan, 
Comment: Up Against the Wall: Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 56 OHIO ST. 
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232 Id.
233 Id.
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235 Id. at 1950.
236 Calvin Massey, The Political Marketplace of Religion, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 46 (2005) (“New York … 
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The first of such attempts at generalization was a statute that required the seceding district 
have at least 2,000 children and possess greater wealth than the state average.237 Despite these 
seemingly neutral criteria, the statute was challenged and invalidated as unconstitutionally 
discriminatory in favor of a particular religious group because in application the only group that 
could meet the statutory criteria was the Hasidic Jews involved in the Grumet case.238
Subsequent modifications of the statute continued to broaden the qualifying criteria but were 
successively challenged and invalidated until at last the challengers gave up.239 The latest 
version—the one that now governs and allows the Hasidic Jews a separate school district—uses 
criteria that are broad enough to cover twenty-nine municipalities in New York. As this latest 
version has never been legally challenged, no court has ever analyzed its constitutionality.240
The Grumet statute raises an important question about measures falling under the 
“untainted fruits” category: at what point is a measure sufficiently generalized so that it no 
longer singles out a religious group for special treatment? This inquiry is largely one of “primary 
effect” and is a prerequisite to the “untainted fruits” analysis—that is, before an objective 
purpose analysis of these measures is conducted, it must first have truly lost its discriminatory 
effect (after all, a discriminatory effect is sufficient to invalidate a measure on establishment 
grounds). In the case of the several subsequent amendments of the Grumet statute, despite its 
increasingly generalized criteria, the statute was time and again deemed inadequately generalized 
because of its discriminatory effect. In the case of evolution disclaimers, generalized disclaimers 
will likely be considered neutral enough because they remove the primary constitutional flaw of 
237
 Glasser, supra note 231, at 1974 n.206.
238
 Massey, supra note 236, at 46 (“The first attempt failed because only the Kiryas Joel community met the 
ostensibly neutral criteria.”).
239 Id. (“The second attempt, which permitted municipalities within an existing school district to form their own 
independent school district if they met certain wealth and population criteria designed to ensure the sustainability of 
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current disclaimers—the discrimination among belief systems in favor of religious beliefs that 
find evolutionary theory problematic. 
Besides raising this question about how generalized a measure has to be in order for it to 
lose the “taint” of its source, the subsequent history of the Grumet statute also reveals an 
important benefit about the untainted fruits approach. As the post-Grumet statutory history may 
be read to suggest, in the absence of the untainted fruits approach, a court may refuse to save a 
modified version of an originally unconstitutional measure as long as its history points to an 
invalid purpose. Arguably, the successive challenges to the statute were likely centered on, or 
motivated by, the fact that the original statute unconstitutionally favored a particular religious 
group. Subsequent changes to the statute were never considered sufficient because they kept 
allowing the originally favored religious group to be singled out for special treatment. The 
statute that currently allows for a special school district for the Hasidic Jew community in New 
York has never been challenged, and it therefore remains unknown whether any court would 
have looked beyond the history of the statute and instead conducted an objective secular purpose 
analysis, as the untainted fruits approach would require if implemented.
ii. McCreary.
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky241 provides another 
example of a government measure that is rooted in a constitutionally problematic history but is 
evolving (or purporting to evolve) toward neutrality. McCreary deals with the latest of a series of 
exhibits involving the Ten Commandments. After previous displays of the Commandments in 
the county courthouses had been challenged by the ACLU and struck down on establishment 
grounds, the counties adopted resolutions calling for exhibits that were broader in scope—that is, 
241 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
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exhibits that demonstrated the Ten Commandments’ effect on the larger American legal 
framework.242  In response to these resolutions, the counties revised the exhibits, titling them 
"Foundations of American Law and Government" and alleging that the purpose of the exhibits 
was to educate citizens about all of the documents displayed, including the Ten 
Commandments.243
The key difference between the series of exhibits in McCreary and the modification of 
the current form of disclaimer to a generalized one is that the McCreary exhibit did not change in 
any fundamental, substantive way from its previous form. The Court emphasized that in order for 
the exhibits to be truly secularized rather than simply purporting to be, the Ten Commandments 
had to be integrated “into a secular scheme to forestall the broadcast of an otherwise clearly 
religious message.”244 Despite the county’s statement that the Ten Commandments were serving 
the secular purpose of educating citizens about their country’s legal history, the Court ruled that 
such a statement was merely a cover up and that the genuine purpose was religious.245
Interestingly, the Court used the controversial history of previous displays to support its 
conclusion, stating that from the perspective of the “reasonable observer,” the history of 
litigation surrounding the Ten Commandment display was a key factor in determining the 
constitutionality of the current exhibit.246 The role of history in determining the display’s purpose 
was the center of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis as well, as an amicus curiae brief in favor of the 
petitioners argued:
The Sixth Circuit's use of the "unconstitutional taint" concept presupposes present 
unconstitutionality, unless enough time has passed to remove the stigma. In so doing, the 
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 2737.
245 Id. at 2734.
246 Id. at 2737.
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Sixth Circuit has refused to accept the government's articulated purpose and has treated 
the stated purpose with automatic suspicion simply because the actor "has a past."247
The Court’s approach in McCreary may appear to counter the premises of the untainted 
fruits approach, but the essential difference between the Court’s analysis in McCreary and the 
proposed jurisprudential approach to the generalized disclaimer is the Court’s emphasis on how 
despite claims of secularization, the Ten Commandment display remained overtly and obviously 
religious.248 In order for a measure to be classified as “untainted,” it must become genuinely 
secularized (as determined by the “sham” inquiry).  The key factor in determining secularization 
is the primary effect of the government measure at issue.  The secular purpose and primary effect 
analyses intersect and overlap in this regard, with the latter informing the former; when the effect 
is neutral, the purpose of a government act—viewed through the eyes of an objective, reasonable 
observer—is secular as well.249
Although in some establishment cases the Court has used a subjective definition of 
“secular purpose,” in the case of measures that are rooted in a history of unconstitutionality but 
have since been modified, an objective analysis is more suited to addressing and protecting the 
free exercise elements involved.  Otherwise, as noted by the amicus brief quoted above, the very 
history of a measure may determine its present constitutional status, despite the fact that on the 
whole, the measure is both perceived as secular and serves a secular goal.  
In comparing the successive displays in McCreary, the Court noted the vast similarities and 
allowed the history of litigation to define the constitutional analysis because no fundamental 
247 Amicus Curiae Brief of Thomas More Law Center, in support of Petitioners at *6, McCreary County v. American 
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (No. 03-1693).
248 Id.
249
 Brief of Freedom from Religion Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents at *15, McCreary 
County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (No 03-1693).
The issue is not the subjective motives of the individual legislator or official; the issue is the government's 
intended purpose, which is demonstrated by the public acts and statements of the government itself … a 
court does not "psychoanalyze" the individual legislator … The legislative intent is determined through a 
rational, objective process from the public statements and acts of the government.
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change had occurred between the current and former displays.250 In contrast, the generalized 
disclaimer seeks to accommodate religious concerns not through artificial modifications to the 
disclaimer, but through altering the very facet of disclaimers that make them unconstitutional—
that is, by making disclaimers neutral where they before discriminated among religions and 
between religion and non-religion.  If the primary effect of a generalized disclaimer is religiously 
neutral, its purpose—viewed objectively—would be neutral as well.
iii. Kitzmiller.
The court in Kitzmiller251 went into extensive detail regarding various aspects of intelligent 
design’s problematic history.  This analysis dealt largely with the religious roots of intelligent 
design theory and then went on to link the teaching of this theory to the larger history of 
creationism in public schools.252  The first part of the court’s discussion is not relevant to the 
untainted fruits analysis of generalized disclaimers because the generalized disclaimer is in no 
way related to intelligent design theory nor any theory about the origins of life.  With respect to 
generalized disclaimers, no history exists which would mark it as a measure that is inherently 
religious. Perhaps the substance of the proposed disclaimer with its focus on the scientific 
enterprise as a specifically human endeavor—that is, with human limitations—can somehow be 
linked to religion, but such a connection is tenuous at best.
The latter portion of the court’s objective purpose analysis is important to an assessment of 
the untainted fruits approach because it emphasizes the neutral primary effect requirement.  The 
court notes that the reasonable observer, whether he/she is a student or an adult Dover citizen, 
250 Id. at 2736 (The previous display and the current one “had two obvious similarities ... both set out a text of the 
Commandments as distinct from any traditionally symbolic representation, and each stood alone, not part of an 
arguably secular display”).
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would interpret the insertion of intelligent design theory as part and parcel of the religious 
attempt at countering evolution teaching.253  The religious underpinnings of intelligent design 
link it to creationism. Further, the specific wording of the intelligent design disclaimer and the 
manner in which it is presented underscores this religious connection: “while encouraging 
students to keep an open mind and explore alternatives to evolution, [the intelligent design 
disclaimer] offers no scientific alternative; instead, the only alternative offered is an inherently 
religious one, namely intelligent design.”254
Moreover, the fact that no other topic taught in school was preceded by a disclaimer meant 
evolution was distinguished as somehow being worthy of special caution, thus emphasizing the 
link to the history of creationism in public schools.255 The disclaimer was accompanied by the 
statement “there will be no other discussion of the issue and your teachers will not answer 
questions on the issue”—leading the reasonable, objective student to “conclude that [intelligent 
design] is a kind of ‘secret science that students apparently can’t discuss with their science 
teacher.’”256  Finally, the “opt out” feature, whereby students who do not want to hear the 
disclaimer can opt out of being exposed to it, “adds ‘novelty,’ thereby enhancing the importance 
of the disclaimer in the students’ eyes.”257 All of these features about the substance and 
presentation of the disclaimer led to the primary effect of establishing religion, causing the court, 
in speaking from the perspective of the objective observer, to attribute a religious purpose to the 
intelligent design disclaimer.  As such, the Kitzmiller opinion underscores the fundamental 
premise of the untainted fruits approach—a measure can be distinguished as an “untainted fruit” 
of its unconstitutional roots only if its primary effect is religiously neutral.  
253 Id. at 46.
254 Id. at 56.
255 Id. at 57.
256 Id. at 58.
257 Id. at 60.
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4. Implications of the Untainted Fruits Approach
The generalized disclaimers analysis proposes that mere history of religious bias is not, or 
should not, be enough to invalidate a government measure that is motivated by a legitimate 
secular purpose and that has a secular primary effect. The way in which generalized disclaimers 
secularize an otherwise religious measure while effectively responding to valid concerns 
provides a model for purging the taint of other measures that are designed to reform historically 
impermissible statutes for the purposes of responding to legitimate free exercise concerns. The 
focus in each such case of modification is changing the primary discriminatory effect of the 
original measure into a neutral one. As discussed in the “primary effect” analysis of currently 
enacted evolution disclaimers, singling out one religious group or religious groups in general is 
constitutionally problematic. Any modified version of a measure must remedy this flaw such that 
the overall effect is neutral and adequately generalized.
Significantly, the untainted fruits approach saves these types of measures from being 
constitutionally invalidated by responding to and protecting the unique free exercise issues raised 
by them. Measures that serve legitimate free exercise concerns are worth salvaging as long as 
they serve the larger neutrality principles of the Establishment Clause. Therefore, once a measure 
becomes sufficiently generalized, it should not be rejected on the basis of a subjective purpose 
analysis. The “untainted fruits” category ensures this much.
CONCLUSION
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is complicated, and at times confusing. Simple labels 
such as “secular purpose” and “primary effect” are used to explain a multitude of establishment 
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tests, thus collapsing important differences among unique religious issues. Justice O’Connor’s 
fact-based approach, implemented in the form of a categorical analysis, suggests a method more 
attuned to the complexities of establishment problems and may go a long way toward resolving 
jurisprudential confusion in this area. 
The value of the fact-based method is demonstrated by the “untainted fruits” category 
and its use in analyzing the proposed generalized disclaimers. Because these generalized 
disclaimers are rooted in the religiously charged evolution controversy, they raise important 
questions about how the “secular purpose” analysis should be conducted in cases that involve 
presently generalized, non-discriminatory government measures that emerge from a 
constitutionally problematic history.  The untainted fruits approach is designed to analyze such 
measures in a manner more attuned to their free exercise implications. The determination in all 
such cases is whether the fruit of the poisonous tree has in fact lost its taint; thus protecting the 
untainted fruit, despite its problematic origins, will ensure a proper balance between free exercise 
and establishment interests and facilitate the evolution toward neutrality of similar such 
measures.
